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THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES 
IN ADULT JAILS AND PRISONS: A CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT? 
ANTHONY GIANNETTI t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One week after his sixteenth birthday, J.S.1 was arrested in 
New York for several property and motor vehicle offenses 
including petit larceny and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 
Prior to these offenses, J.S. had no criminal history or any 
involvement with the criminal justice system. However, under 
New York law, which sets the jurisdictional age of the adult 
criminal justice system at 16, 2 J.S. was tried in adult criminal court 
as a youthful offender and sentenced to one-and-a-half to four 
years in state prison. As part of a plea deal, J.S. agreed to serve six 
months at a "Shock Incarceration" facility in lieu of one and a half 
to four years in state prison. 
However, his chances of surviving a six month sentence of 
"Shock Incarceration" were destined to fail. Standing only five feet 
two inches tall and weighing under one hundred thirty pounds, J.S. 
had a diminutive stature and was frequently the target of bullying 
while in school. While incarcerated, J.S. was housed in open 
dormitories with older teens and men in their early twenties. 
Because of his stature, he became the target of verbal abuse and 
physical assault by both inmates and corrections officers. On at 
least three occasions, J.S. was assaulted by corrections officers and 
locked in a custodial closet overnight. These acts were allegedly 
"TAnthony Giannetti is a student at SUNY Buffalo Law School, J.D. Candidate 
2013. 
'All information concerning J.S. was obtained from confidential interviews with 
him and letters he wrote while incarcerated. As such, citations to these 
interviews will be omitted. 
2 As of 2007, New York and North Carolina are the only states that set the 
jurisdictional age of the adult criminal system at 16. See SCHUYLER CENTER FOR 
ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY, RAISING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
NEW YORK STATE: THE RIGHT THING To Do 1 (2010), http://www. 
scaany.org/resources/documents/cpaenews issue23 raisetheage.pdf. 
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done in retaliation against J.S. for attempting to write letters to his 
family and file institutional grievances regarding the abusive 
treatment he was receiving while incarcerated. 
J.S.'s attempts to communicate his grievances failed. His 
letters went unanswered; no official action was taken regarding his 
grievances of physical abuse. The day after he was assaulted and 
locked in a custodial closet for a third time, J.S. left the facility, 
believing abscondment to be the only possibility for relief from 
abuse. There was no secure perimeter at the facility. While on 
work detail, J.S. simply walked out of the facility into the woods. 
He was found the next day sitting by a lake, cold and hungry. 
Following his capture, J.S. was transferred to a maximum 
security adult prison where he was charged with violating various 
prison regulations related to his escape. As a result of these 
charges, J.S. was sentenced to three years in solitary confinement,
3 
in addition to other sanctions. Because he failed to complete his 
required term of "Shock Incarceration," J.S.'s original sentence of 
one-and-a-half to four years in state prison was reinstated. He may 
also face criminal escape charges, which could result in an 
additional sentence of up to five years in state prison. Recently, 
J.S. celebrated his seventeenth birthday in solitary confinement. 
This tragic account of a juvenile's experience in the adult 
criminal justice system demonstrates how the adult system is often 
ill-equipped to deal with juvenile offenders. Unfortunately, 
however, this account of physical abuses, an inability to air 
grievances, and placement in solitary confinement mirrors the 
experiences of many juveniles caught in the adult system.4 
3 In addition to being one of only two states that set the jurisdictional age of the 
adult criminal system at 16, New York also leads the nation in the percentage of 
inmates held in disciplinary solitary confinement. On April 23, 2003 7.6% of 
New York inmates were held in disciplinary solitary confinement. The national 
average for that same day was 2.5%. See CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., LOCKDOWN 
NEW YORK: DISCIPLINARY CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 
20 (2003), (stating "New York's use of disciplinary segregation seems 
extraordinarily high."), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/05/lockdown-new-york report.pdf.
4 If not for punitive measures, many juveniles in adult prison are placed in 
solitary confinement "for their own protection." See Jean Casella & James 
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In recent years, juvenile justice policy in the United States 
has become the focus of much scrutiny because of a growing 
national trend favoring a more punitive approach to juvenile 
offenders. 5 This trend began in the 1990's as a response to public 
outcry against "out-of-control" juvenile crime and fear of a coming 
generation of juvenile "super predators." 6 In response to this public 
outcry, many state legislatures passed laws allowing greater 
discretion by judges and prosecutors in transferring juveniles to 
adult court.7 Between 1992 and 1997, 44 states and the District of 
Columbia passed laws facilitating the transfer of juveniles to the 
adult system.8 As a result of these policy changes, an estimated 
200,000 juveniles are tried annually as adults. 9 Additionally, on 
any given day, an estimated 11,300 juvenile offenders are 
incarcerated in adult facilities in the United States.10 This number 
is a 662% increase from 1984.11 
Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement of Teens in 
Adult Prison,SOLITARY WATCH, Jan. 30, 2010, http://solitarywatch.com/2010/ 
01/30/children-in-lockdown-part- I-solitary-confinement-of-kids-in-adult-
prisons/; Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, Children Routinely Held in Pre-
Trial Solitary Confinement in Texas SOLITARY WATCH, October 22, 2010, 
http://solitarywatch.com/2010/10/22/children-routinely-held-in-pre-trial-
solitary-confinement-in-texas/.
5 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 246 (4th ed. 
2009).
6 MALCOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI GAINSBOROUGH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND 
CONSEQUENCES 2 (2000), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/juvenile.pdf. 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 CHILDREN'S ACTION ALLIANCE, PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN THE ADULT 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2003), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/ 
documents/AZ ProsecutingJuveniles.pdf. 
9 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF 
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 16 (2007), http:// 
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-
Jailing Juveniles Report 2007-11-15.pdf. 
10 Casella & Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement ofTeens in 
Adult Prison, supra note 4. 
11 See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN 
ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2000), http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/bja/182503 .pdf. 
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However, this trend of imposing adult punishments on 
juvenile offenders has been subjected to some judicial constraints 
in recent years. Specifically, the recent Supreme Court decisions in 
Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Floridahave limited state and 
federal authority to impose adult punishments on juvenile 
offenders consistent with the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on 
offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes 
were committed.12 Similarly, in Graham, the Supreme Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment does not permit a juvenile offender to 
be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicide 
crime. 13 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that 
juveniles are categorically less culpable for their crimes than adults 
and as a result, are less deserving of the most severe
14 
punishments. 
Taking into consideration the recent Supreme Court 
decisions above, this paper will address whether the imposition of 
solitary confinement on a juvenile in adult prison violates the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments. In answering this question affirmatively, this paper 
will argue that solitary confinement of juveniles in adult prison is 
(1) very likely to cause serious injury to juveniles' future health in 
all circumstances and (2) a disproportionate punishment for 
juvenile offenders in light of their diminished culpability when 
applied for punitive reasons. Moreover, an international consensus 
against the practice, as evidenced in international treaties and the 
resolutions of regional human rights institutions, support finding 
the practice to be violative of the Eighth Amendment. 15 Beyond 
the scope of the Eighth Amendment, this paper will address the 
12Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
13Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 23-24 (U.S. May 17, 2010). 
14 Id. at 16-17; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
15 See generally Graham, No. 08-7412; Roper, 543 U.S. In both cases, the 
existence of an international consensus against a particular practice was 
persuasive evidence in finding that practice to be violative of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
2011-2012 Solitary Confinement ofJuveniles 
solitary confinement of juveniles from a policy perspective and 
argue that the practice is counterproductive and serves no useful 
social purpose. 
II. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
According to the United States Department of Justice, 
solitary confinement is defined as: "locking an inmate in an 
isolated cell for an average of twenty-three hours per day with 
limited human interaction, little constructive activity, and an 
environment that assures maximum control over the individual." 
16 
While definitions may vary from facility to facility, for purposes of 
this paper solitary confinement will be defined by the above 
standard. The terms "solitary confinement" and "isolation" will be 
used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
Solitary confinement as a penal technique is thought to 
have been first used at the Hospital San Michele at Rome, in 
1703.17 However, the practice gained significant notoriety for its 
use in the Walnut-Street Penitentiary experiment in Philadelphia in 
1787.18 According to Dr. Stuart Grassian, the United States was 
actually the world leader in introducing solitary confinement as a 
means of dealing with criminal behavior with the rise of the 
penitentiary system in the early nineteenth century. 19 This system,
"originally labeled the 'Philadelphia System,' involved almost 
exclusive reliance upon solitary confinement as a means of 
incarceration" and rehabilitation of individuals with socially 
deviant behaviors. 20 However, the system fell into disfavor and 
was ultimately abandoned after numerous inmates detained in the 
16 CHASE RIVELAND, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW 
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999), http://nicic.org/pubs/1999/014937. 
pdf.
17In Re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1890). 
18 Id. at 168. 
19Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL'Y 325, 328 (2006).
20 [d. 
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system exhibited severe mental disturbances described as a "florid 
delirium, characterized by severe confusional, paranoid, and 
hallucinatory features, and also by intense agitation and random, 
impulsive, often self-directed violence.' 
In 1890, the Supreme Court recognized the severe 
psychological harm caused to inmates by solitary confinement in 
the case of In Re Medley: 
This matter of solitary confinement is not . . . a mere 
unimportant regulation as to the safe-keeping of the 
prisoner ....But experience [has] demonstrated that there 
were serious objections to it. A considerable number of the 
prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-
fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to 
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others 
still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal 
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did 
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any 
subsequent service to the community.
22 
In Medley, the Supreme Court reviewed a change in the state laws 
of Colorado pertaining to the confinement of inmates waiting to be 
executed. Mr. Medley was convicted of murdering his wife in 1889 
and sentenced to death. Under the statute in force at the time of the 
murder, Mr. Medley would have been held in the county jail prior 
to his execution. However, between the murder and his trial, the 
Colorado legislature passed a statute requiring condemned inmates 
to be held in solitary confinement in state prison for one month 
prior to their execution. Mr. Medley was sentenced under the new 
statute and argued that its application imposed a substantial burden 
on him in violation of the ex postfacto clause of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court agreed, viewing one month of solitary 
21 id. 
22 Medley, 143 U.S. at 167-68. 
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confinement as a substantial enough burden to warrant application 
of the ex postfacto clause.23 
Medley is significant because it was the first case to 
explicitly recognize the potentially disastrous effects of solitary 
confinement. Additionally, it was the first case to subject the 
practice to constitutional scrutiny. While Medley analyzed solitary 
confinement under the ex post facto clause, it is still noteworthy 
because it was the first case to strike down a term of solitary 
confinement on constitutional grounds. It also stands for the more 
general proposition that solitary confinement, in some 
circumstances, may violate the Constitution. 
Since Medley, state and federal courts have heard numerous 
cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to the practice of 
solitary confinement. However, thus far, solitary confinement has 
withstood these challenges and is not per se violative of the Eighth 
Amendment. 24 Despite not being struck down as a per se Eighth 
Amendment violation, the practice of solitary confinement now 
seems to be on questionable constitutional footing. Consider the 
following reports authored by the Department of Justice's National 
Institute on Corrections. The 1999 report states, "Generally, the 
overall constitutionality of these programs [solitary confinement 
programs] remains unclear." 25 The 2004 report describes the 
current status of solitary confinement programs as "Living on the 
constitutional edge."26 Nonetheless, the report concluded: 
The fact that an ECU's 27 extremely restrictive conditions 
place it at the very edge of what is constitutionally 
permissible suggests that, with properly developed policies 
3Id. at 161-62. 
24 See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting "long line of cases 
... holding that solitary confinement per se is not 'cruel and unusual').
25 RIVELAND, supranote 16, at 2. 
26 WILLIAM C. COLLINS, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT 8 
(2004), http://nicic.gov/pubs/2004/019835.pdf. 
27 Id. at V. (defining ECU (Extended Control Unit) as a term for a prison's 
solitary confinement unit.) 
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and procedures, it can function in a constitutionally 
acceptable fashion.28 
However, the report did concede, given the current trend in state 
and federal courts, that solitary confinement "may inherently step 
over the constitutional edge with regard to mental health issues for 
some inmates." 29 The question, then, is: In what circumstances 
does solitary confinement step over the constitutional edge? 
III. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted., 30 There is no static test that determines 
whether conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. 31 The inquiry is largely fact-intensive. However, in 
order to plead a successful Eighth Amendment claim against a 
prison official, two requirements must be satisfied. First, the 
deprivation alleged must be, "objectively, sufficiently serious," 
resulting in the denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's 
" 32  necessities. ' Secondly, the prison official imposing the 
deprivation must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind., 
33 
That is, the prison official must subjectively act with "deliberate 
indifference to inmate health or safety." 34 A showing of deliberate 
indifference requires more than "ordinary lack of due care for the 
prisoner's interests or safety" and has recently been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to be comparable to a recklessness standard.3 5 
281d.at8. 
29 [d. 
3oU.S.CONST. amend. VIII. 
31 Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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A. Psychological Pain and Suffering 
Traditionally, in evaluating whether a condition of 
confinement is sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth 
Amendment, courts have focused on the basic components of 
physical sustenance: food, shelter, and medical care. 36 However, as 
noted above, during a more recent trend, courts have recognized 
the inhumanity of institutionally-imposed psychological pain and 
suffering as violating the Eighth Amendment.
3 7 
Generalized psychological pain incident to confinement 
such as boredom, loneliness, and frustration does not rise to the 
level of Eighth Amendment scrutiny.3 8 Yet, if the particular 
conditions of segregation being challenged are such that they 
inflict a serious mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or 
deprive inmates of their sanity, then courts have held inmates have 
been deprived of a basic necessity of human existence in 
contravention of the Eighth Amendment. 39 The Supreme Court has 
adopted a two prong test to determine whether conditions of 
confinement constitute a risk to inmate health sufficient to warrant 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny. According to the Court, the critical 
inquiry concerns whether: 
(1) the risk involved was 'unreasonable' in that the 
challenged conditions were 'sure,' 'very likely,' or 
'imminent[ly]' likely to cause 'serious' damage to the 
inmate's future health, and (2) whether society considers 
the risk to be 'so grave that it violates contemporary 
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such 
40a risk.' 
For instance, in Madrid,the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California considered the constitutionality 
d. at 832. 
37 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 
855 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
38See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986).
39 Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1264. 
40 Id. at 1265 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)). 
36 
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of conditions of confinement in the Secure Housing Unit at a 
California state prison. While the court declined to find the 
conditions of confinement in that unit a per se violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, the court concluded that the conditions of 
confinement, as applied to mentally ill inmates, or those inmates 
"who the record demonstrates are at a particularly high risk for 
suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health," 
constituted an "unreasonable risk" that is surely not one "today's 
society would choose to tolerate. 4 1 In short, the court held that the 
confinement of the above subgroup of prisoners in the SHU 
deprived them of a basic human necessity, mental health, in 
contravention of the Eighth Amendment.42 The court analogized 
placing these inmates in SHU to placing an asthmatic in a room 
with little air to breathe. 
43 
The threshold question for the court in this case was 
whether there was "persuasive evidence that the challenged 
conditions lead to serious mental injury." 44 In answering this 
question affirmatively, the court pointed to the "conditions of 
extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation," 
combined with the particular susceptibility of the above subgroup 
to mental injury.45 
Similarly, in Ruiz, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas found the administrative segregation of 
mentally ill inmates to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
based on the substantial psychological harm caused by deprivation 
of human contact and mental stimuli. 46 Again, the court focused on 
the particular susceptibility of this subgroup to psychological 
harm, relying on the testimony of a psychiatrist who stated that 
"such inmates," by virtue of their particular condition, "need 
contact and social stimuli., 47 The court concluded that depriving 
41Id. at 1265-66. 
42 Id. 
41Id. at 1265. 
4 4 
Id. at 1264. 
45Id. at 1265. 
46 Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
47 Id. at 912. 
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this group of inmates of adequate contact and stimulation 
amounted to a form of psychological torture prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment: 
As the pain and suffering caused by a cat-o'-nine-tails 
lashing an inmate's back are cruel and unusual punishment 
by today's standards of humanity and decency, the pain and 
suffering caused by extreme levels of psychological 
deprivation are equally, if not more, cruel and unusual. The 
wounds and resulting scars, while less tangible, are no less 
painful and permanent when they are inflicted on the 
human psyche.48 
It is important to note that the above decisions establishing 
Eighth Amendment violations for conditions of solitary 
confinement are district court decisions with limited precedential 
value. There is a general lack of federal appellate court decisions 
concerning the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to solitary 
confinement on the grounds that it constitutes impermissible 
psychological torture.49 However, Madrid and Ruiz are significant 
in that they stand for the proposition that solitary confinement, as 
applied to certain individuals, may violate the Eighth Amendment. 
Moreover, this holding is not explicitly limited to those with 
diagnosed mental illnesses. Specifically, in Madrid,the court held 
solitary confinement implicates the Eighth Amendment when 
applied to inmates "who the record demonstrates are at a 
particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to 
their mental health., 50 This expansive class definition certainly 
leaves open the possibility for other challenges to solitary 
confinement. 
48 Id. at 914. 
COLLINS, supranote 26, at 10. 
50 Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1265. 
49 
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B. Solitary Confinement as a Disproportionate 
Punishment 
Beyond challenges to solitary confinement based on the 
psychological pain it causes, solitary confinement may violate the 
Eighth Amendment if the length of confinement is extremely 
disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or is otherwise 
without sufficient penological justification. 5 1 The Supreme Court 
has recognized that "the concept of proportionality is central to the 
Eighth Amendment., 52 Proportionality analysis "requires con-
sideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of 
their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the 
punishment in question." 53 Punishment disproportionate to the 
offense committed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, 
whether imposed with or without prison time. 
54 
However, prison officials are given broad discretion in 
administering prisons, 55 and this broad discretion extends to 
determining the length of disciplinary sentences for violations of 
prison regulations.56 Only in rare circumstances will a court find a 
sentence of solitary confinement to be violative of the Eighth 
Amendment based on a proportionality analysis. For instance, in 
Horne v. Coughlin, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
declined to find an Eighth Amendment proportionality violation 
where a mentally retarded, functionally illiterate inmate was 
detained for six months in solitary confinement for making 
sexually suggestive remarks to a female civilian volunteer.57 The 
inmate allegedly made the following remarks to the female 
volunteer: "Just give me a little kiss on the cheek or anywhere else 
you please ....I wouldn't do bad to a woman and she gives it up 
cause she wants it.",58 Despite the inmate's I.Q. of 65, and 
51O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974).
52 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 22 (U.S. May 17, 2010). 
53Id. at 37. 
54 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910). 
55Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983).
56 
id. 
57 Home v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1998).
5
1 [d. at 27-28. 
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relatively innocuous nature of the remarks, the court summarily 
rejected his proportionality claim, with the analysis occupying only 
three sentences of the opinion. 59 
Similarly, in Sostre v. McGinnis, the same appeals court 
declined to find an Eighth Amendment proportionality violation 
where an inmate was sentenced to an indefinite term of solitary 
confinement for (1) attempting to mail a legal motion on behalf of 
his codefendant to a NAACP attorney and (2) refusing to answer 
questions concerning his involvement in an alleged black separatist 
organization. 60 There, the court iterated the significant degree of 
deference granted to state officials in administering prisons as a 
primary rationale for rejecting the proportionality claim. As the 
court opined, "[flor a federal court .. . to place a punishment 
beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic 
interference with the state's free political and administrative 
processes." 61  The court declined to find the sentence 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment despite its 
recognition that the sentence may be "unsound" or even 
"personally repugnant" to some of the justices.62 
The above decisions reflect the reluctance of courts to 
interfere with the discretion of prison administrators, particularly 
in imposing sanctions for violations of prison regulations. This is 
true even when severe sanctions are imposed for de minimis 
infractions. 
However, the discretion of prison officials is not unlimited. 
In some circumstances, courts will void disciplinary sentences as 
unconstitutionally disproportionate. For instance, in Chapman v. 
Pickett,the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found a seven 
month sentence in solitary confinement to be unconstitutionally 
disproportionate to the offense of refusing to handle pork while on 
kitchen clean up detail.63 There, the court based its decision, in 
part, on the fact that the inmate refused to handle pork for religious 
59 
Id. at 31. 
60 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 183, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1971). 
61 Id. at 191. 
62 id. 
63 Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 28 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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reasons, seeming to insinuate that the punishment might not have64 
been disproportionate had the inmate refused for other reasons. 
Similarly, in Adams v. Carlson,a case remanded for factual 
determinations by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois upheld the 
Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim of 36 inmates who 
served 16 months in solitary confinement for participating, or 
attempting to participate, in a prison work stoppage as a protest 
against prison conditions. 65 While the court based its decision on a 
disproportionality analysis, it also discussed, at length, the 
particularly oppressive conditions of the Secure Housing Unit at 
Marion Penitentiary. The inmates were confined to 8 by 6 cells for 
23-and-a-half hours per day.66 Moreover, the inmates were denied 
access to radios, commissary, clocks, educational materials, and 
were often required to eat from the floors of their cells. 67 It seems 
evident that these conditions played at least some role in the 
court's finding of an Eighth Amendment violation. 
Based on the above cases, there does not appear to be a 
definitive, or even principled, test to determine when a disciplinary 
sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. Beyond ideological 
differences between circuits, it is difficult to reconcile the 
conclusions reached in Sostre and Adams. In both cases, the 
offenses were of relatively equal magnitude, yet Sostreupheld an 
indefinite sentence while Adams struck down a 16 month sentence. 
It seems that courts may be likely to find a sentence 
disproportionate where additional factors, beyond the length of the 
sentence itself, are present. In Sostre, the particular conditions of 
the solitary confinement unit were significant while in Chapman, 
the constitutionally protected nature of the inmate's refusal to 
follow an order was highlighted. In light of the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions in Roper and Graham,the young age of an inmate 
may be a persuasive additional factor supporting a finding of 
disproportionality. 
64 Id. at 24. 
65 Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050, 1053-54 (E.D. I1. 1973). 
66 Id. at 1052. 
67 [d. 
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IV. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES 
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
BECAUSE IT CAUSES SERIOUS DAMAGE 
TO JUVENILES' FUTURE HEALTH 
As stated above, The Supreme Court has adopted a two 
prong test to determine when conditions of confinement constitute 
a risk to inmate health sufficient to warrant Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny. The critical inquiry is whether: 
(1) the risk involved was 'unreasonable' in that the 
challenged conditions were 'sure,' 'very likely,' or 
'imminent[ly]' likely to cause 'serious' damage to the 
inmate's future health, and (2) whether society considers 
the risk to be 'so grave that it violates contemporary 
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such 
68 
a risk.' 
Solitary confinement, as applied to juveniles, satisfies this test 
because it causes serious damage by inhibiting the normal 
psychological development of juveniles. As discussed below, this 
inhibition is irreversible and may have substantial impacts on the 
juvenile later in life, including impaired cognitive and social 
functioning. Like the mentally ill inmates in Ruiz and Madridwho 
were particularly susceptible to the psychological harm of isolation 
by virtue of their abnormal brain functioning, juveniles are 
similarly susceptible to these harms by virtue of their 
underdeveloped brains. 
Adolescence is a crucial and necessary period of plasticity 
when brain circuitry and behavior are beginning to be 
established.69 These changes in brain circuitry and functioning that 
occur during adolescence most significantly impact brain regions 
68 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
69 DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN 
PREGNANCY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS 2 (2005), 
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/BRAIN.pdf. 
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associated with response inhibition, planning, the calibration of 
risk and reward, and emotion regulation. 70  Moreover, the 
opportunities and constraints created by a child's environment play 
an important role in this period of development. 71 Current research 
suggests that isolation 72 affects adolescent brain development, and 
ultimately, adult maturation. Essentially, in order to develop fully, 
the juvenile brain needs environmental stimuli and social 
interaction. Without such stimuli and interaction during this critical 
period, development will be substantially impaired. Consider the 
sworn statement of Dr. Stuart Grassian, an expert on the effects of 
solitary confinement, in his affidavit from the J.S. case discussed 
above: 
The risk of permanent harm from long-term SHU 
confinement is especially great for a young person such as 
J.S. At 16 years old, the brain is not fully developed. The 
brain learns, especially in youth; its plasticity is critical to 
emotional and cognitive maturation. But it cannot do so in 
isolation; it needs experience - things to "chew on," to 
learn from. Depriving J.S. of the opportunity for such 
experience now, at such a critical developmental period 
will inevitably prevent and distort development. I am 
particularly concerned about J.S.'s relationship with 
people. Many people who have spent time in solitary 
confinement become intolerant of personal relationships. 
73 
The harm caused to juveniles by isolation is distinctly 
different and more severe than the harm caused to adults because 
of its irreparability. Once the developmental window passes for a 
70 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Adolescent Development andJuvenile Justice,5 
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466 (2009).
71Werner Greve, Imprisonment of Juveniles and Adolescents: Deficits and 
Demandsfor Developmental Research,5 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 21, 26 (2001).
72 Ben Kleinman, Administrative and Punitive Segregation of Juveniles in Jails 
and Prisons: Cruel, Unusual, and Awaiting Condemnation 20 (Jan. 2008) 
(unpublished paper, available at: http://works.bepress.com/ben kleinman/3).
73 Grassian, Affidavit, 29(December 18, 2010). 
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juvenile, the brain cannot go back and redevelop at some point in 
the future; the developmental effects are likely permanent. This 
inhibition of development not only fundamentally alters the 
cognitive abilities of the juvenile, but, as mentioned above and 
below, significantly impacts social relationships and social 
identity.74 Consider the following opinion of Dr. Craig Haney, 
professor of psychology at the University of California at Santa 
Cruz: 
The political stereotype is that a fourteen- or sixteen-year-
old who commits an adult crime must be as sophisticated as 
an adult when paradoxically these kids are most often 
younger than their age emotionally. Regardless of what 
they have done, they are in an uncertain, unformed state of 
social identity. These are kids who are the least appropriate 
to place in solitary confinement. Not only are you putting 
them [juveniles] in a situation where they have nothing to 
rely on but their own, underdeveloped internal 
mechanisms, but you are making it impossible for them to 
develop a healthy functioning adult social identity. You're 
basically taking someone who's in the process of finding 
out who they are and twisting their psyche in a way that 
will make it very, very difficult for them to ever recover. 75 
Again, the high likelihood of irreparable damage is of concern to 
Dr. Haney. While isolation certainly poses immediate 
psychological harm to both adults and juveniles, the long term 
effects on juveniles are potentially disastrous. Isolation of juveniles 
is likely to result in the formation of an adult personality that is 
cognitively and socially impaired, essentially depriving the 
individual of any chance of functioning normally in society. 
This is problematic from a policy perspective because a 
significant portion of the 11,300 juveniles incarcerated annually in 
74 See Kleinman, supranote 72 at 17 (stating "the lack of stimulation could be a 
missed opportunity for continued development"). 
75 Matt Olson, Kids in the Hole Juvenile Offenders, THE PROGRESSIVE, (Aug. 
2003) (quoting Craig Haney). 
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adult facilities will, at some point, return to society. Most of these 
juveniles will have been held in solitary confinement for some 
period of their incarceration. 76 The distorted cognitive and social 
development resulting from isolation is likely to cause problems 
reintegrating into society and may lead to anti-social behavior and 
subsequent incarceration. This is especially true considering the 
developmental faculties that are likely disrupted by isolation, 
calibration of risk and reward and emotional regulation.77 It seems 
apparent that an individual who is released from prison with an 
inability to assess risks and rewards or effectively regulate his 
emotions is at much greater risk for reoffending. Evidence for this 
theory can be found in research indicating that juveniles processed 
in adult criminal court are more likely to recidivate than those 
processed in juvenile court. 78 Infact, at least one study pointed to 
the use of solitary confinement in adult facilities as one factor that 
may contribute to higher rates of recidivism. 
79 
Considering the evidence above, the grave potential of 
future harm posed to juveniles by solitary confinement is at least as 
severe as the harm faced by the inmates in Madridand Ruiz, which 
was sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation under 
the Supreme Court's two prong test. In fact, the harm posed to 
juveniles may be more substantial because of its irreparability. 
Juveniles, like the inmates in Madrid and Ruiz, are "at a par-
ticularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to 
[their] mental health" because their brains will not fully develop in 
76 Casella & Ridgeway, Children in Lockdown: Solitary Confinement ofTeens in 
Adult Prison, supra note 4. 
77 Steinberg, supra note 70, at 466. 
78 See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice 
System, 27 CRIME & JUSTICE 81, 81 (2000) (concluding "there is credible 
evidence to that prosecution and punishment in the adult system increase the 
likelihood of recidivism"); RICHARD E. REDDING, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE 
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 4 (2010) (finding "large-scale studies indicate 
that youth tried in adult criminal court generally have greater recidivism rates 
after release than those tried in juvenile court").
79 Bishop, supranote 78 at 139. 
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isolation. 80 From a policy perspective, this risk is intolerable and 
violative of contemporary standards of decency because it 
essentially prevents affected juveniles from becoming normally 
adjusted adults in society. Moreover, it places these juveniles at 
much greater risk for reoffending when they are released. 
V. PUNITIVE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF 
JUVENILES VIOLATES THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS A 
DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 
As stated above, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
juveniles are categorically less culpable for their crimes than adults 
and, as a result, are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments81 . The Supreme Court has recognized at least two 
fundamental differences between adults and juveniles that support 
a finding of diminished juvenile culpability. First, "[a] lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found 
in youth more often that in adults and are more understandable 
among the young., 82 Second, the "character of a juvenile is not as 
well formed as that of an adult,"83 making it less likely that 
juveniles fall amongst the "worst offenders." 
In the prison context, solitary confinement is the harshest 
penalty available to prison administrators. It is analogous to the 
imposition of the death penalty in criminal law. There is a broad 
range of less severe sanctions available to prison administrators 
that include restrictions on inmate privileges ranging from 
reducing personal visits to limiting commissary. Just as the 
Supreme Court has categorically presumed juveniles to be unfit for 
the harshest penalty in the context of criminal law because of their 
diminished culpability, 84 juveniles are similarly unfit for the 
harshest penalty in the prison context for the same reason. 
80 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
81 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
82 Id. at 569. 
83 Id. at 570. 
14 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 49 (U.S. May 17, 2010). 
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Current scientific research suggests that "juveniles lack the 
culpability of adults because their brains are fundamentally and 
significantly different from adult brains."85 The brain's frontal 
lobe, which exercises control over impulsive behavior, does not 
even begin to mature until seventeen years of age. 86 Because 
juveniles lack a developed frontal lobe, they tend to process 
decisions in the limbic system, the part of the brain charged with 
instinctive (and often impulsive) reactions. 87 An adult's fully 
developed frontal lobe is typically able to curb impulsive decisions 
coming from other parts of the brain such as the limbic system. 
88 
The same is not true for juveniles. As such, normal juveniles 
cannot be expected to operate with the level of maturity, judgment, 
risk aversion or impulse control of an adult.89 Essentially, many of 
the foolish, sometimes criminal, decisions made by juveniles can 
be attributed to their undeveloped frontal lobes. It is not a novel 
proposition that juveniles often make impulsive decisions. For this 
reason, juveniles are not afforded the same privileges as adults 
such as driving, voting, and drinking privileges. For this same 
reason, juveniles should not be subjected the same severe penalties 
as adults, particularly the death penalty and solitary confinement. 
Beyond diminished culpability, the solitary confinement of 
juveniles is a disproportionate punishment because the psy-
chological pain experienced by juveniles is subjectively greater 
than that experienced by adults. At least one federal district court 
in New York has recognized the disparate impact of solitary 
confinement on juveniles: 
[E]xtended isolation of a youngster exposes him to 
conditions equivalent to 'sensory deprivation.' This is a 
state of affairs which will cause a normal adult to begin 
8 Tracy Rightmer, Juveniles' Immature Brains Make Them Less Culpable Than 
Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 4 (2005).
16 [d. at 24. 
" David E. Arredondo, Principlesof Child Development and Juvenile Justice, 
Informationfor Decision-Makers, 5 J. CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILD., & CTS. 127, 
129 (2004). 
8 Rightmer, supranote 85, at 24. 
89 Id. at 23-24. 
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experiencing psychotic-like symptoms, and will push a 
troubled person in the direction of serious emotional 
illness. What is true in this case for adults is of even greater 
concern with children and adolescents. Youngsters are in 
general more vulnerable to emotional pressures than mature 
adults; isolation is a condition of extraordinarily severe 
psychic stress; the resultant impact on the mental health of 
the individual exposed to such stress will always be serious, 
and can occasionally be disastrous.
90 
Because juveniles require more emotional support and human 
interaction than adults, the negative impacts of solitary 
confinement are exacerbated as applied to juveniles. Additionally, 
juveniles subjectively experience any given duration of sanction as 
longer because of how they experience time.9' In practical terms, 
sentencing a juvenile to 36 months in solitary confinement, as was 
the case with J.S., while extremely severe in and of itself, is much 
more severe than an equivalent sentence for a 32 year old man. For 
J.S., such a sentence amounts to nearly 20% of his current lifespan, 
while, for the 32 year old, the same sentence amounts to just under 
10% of his current lifespan. In Graham, the Supreme Court 
explicitly adopted this reasoning as a factor in finding life without 
parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders an unconstitutionally 
disproportionate punishment. As Justice Kennedy stated in 
Graham: 
Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a 
juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his 
life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 
75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive 
the same punishment in name only.
92 
90 Lollis v. New York Dep't Soc. Servs., 322 F.Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(quoting affidavit of Dr. Joseph D. Noshpitz, M.D.).
91 Arredondo, supra note 87, at 131. 
92 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 43 (U.S. May 17, 2010). 
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This disproportionate effect of solitary confinement on 
juveniles in terms of (1) the greater qualitative level of suffering 
they experience compared to adults and (2) the subjectively longer 
quantitative duration of punishment they experience compared to 
adults, supports finding an Eighth Amendment violation. These 
disparate qualitative and quantitative impacts on juveniles might be 
a sufficient "additional factor" to reach a conclusion of 
disproportionality. Recall Adams, where the Seventh Circuit found 
a 16 month sentence of solitary confinement to be uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate based, in part, on the particularly 
oppressive conditions of the confinement cells. Here, the 
particularly oppressive effect of solitary confinement on juveniles, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, supports the same finding. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBITING THE 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES 
IS INSTRUCTIVE TO THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
It is well settled that the laws and customs of the 
international community are instructive in defining the scope and 
content of Federal Constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has 
unequivocally endorsed this position: 
For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law 
of the United States recognizes the law of nations .... It 
would take some explaining to say now that the federal 
courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international 
norm intended to protect individuals. 
93 
Also consider the opinion of former Supreme Court Justice 
Harry Blackmun: 
93 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-30 (2004). 
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The early architects of our Nation understood that the 
customs of nations - the global opinion of mankind -
would be binding on the newly forged nation. 
94 
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the 
significance of customary international law in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual 
punishments." The Court's history is replete with cases in which 
international standards have informed the Court's view of what 
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishments." 95 In determining 
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts look to the 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." 96 These standards of decency are not limited to 
the confines of our national borders. 
The practice of imposing solitary confinement on juveniles 
violates customary international law and international agreements, 
specifically the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).97 
Customary international law is that which "results from a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation."98 International agreements "create law for the 
states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary 
international law when such agreements are intended for adherence 
94 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE 
L.J. 39, 39 (1994).
95 See Graham, No. 08-7412 at 62-63 (noting the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against life without parole for non-homicide offenses 
committed by juveniles); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005) 
(noting the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile 
death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.304, 316 (2002) (considering the 
national and international community's rejection of death penalty for persons 
with mental retardation); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (noting
"virtual unanimity" within international community that denationalization 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
96 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
97 Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.273, 58, a-b (Sept. 30, 2005) (recommending "abolition of the 
practice" but for "very exceptional cases").
9' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987). 
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by states generally and are in fact widely accepted." 99 Furthermore,
"a very widespread and representative participation in a convention 
might suffice of itself' to establish customary international law.
100 
The prohibition against the use of solitary confinement on 
juveniles satisfies the above criteria. It is a customary practice and 
treaty rule under the CRC, ratified by all countries except the 
United States and Somalia. 10 1 Article 37 of the CRC provides, in 
part, "No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment . . ." and "[e]very child 
deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which 
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age." The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the treaty body that 
monitors compliance with the CRC, has interpreted Article 37 to 
preclude the use of solitary confinement but for "very exceptional 
cases" and has otherwise mandated abolition of the practice.' 
0 2 
Moreover, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty, adopted by the General Assembly, 
strictly prohibit placement in "closed or solitary confinement" as a 
form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.'
0 3 
Regional human rights institutions, particularly the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), have likewise 
condemned the imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles. 
The IACHR is a permanent body of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) that is responsible for adopting human rights 
standards for member states. The IACHR has interpreted the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which the 
99 Id. at §102(3).
100 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark & Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 42 (February 20). 
101The United States and Somalia are the only countries in the world that failed 
to ratify the CRC. However, Somalia has recently announced plans to ratify the 
CRC. See Somalia to Join Child Rights Pact: UN, REUTERS AFRICA, Nov. 20, 
2009, availableat http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE5AJOIT 
20091120. 
102Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.273, 58, a-b (Sept. 30, 2005).
103 G.A. Res. 45/113, 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
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United States has ratified, to strictly forbid the imposition of 
solitary confinement on children deprived of liberty.' 0 4 In fact, this 
prohibition is binding on all member states as a result of the 
unanimous ratification of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man. 
Virtually all countries in the world have rejected the 
imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles by virtue of the 
near unanimous ratification of the CRC. The position of the 
IACHR provides additional support for international condemnation 
of the practice. These treaty provisions and findings of treaty 
bodies, while not dispositive, are highly persuasive that solitary 
confinement of juveniles constitutes a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. A comparison to Roper is illustrative. 
In Roper, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles amounts to a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. In answering this question 
affirmatively, the Court referred to the laws of other countries and 
international authorities as instructive in interpreting the scope of 
the Eighth Amendment. In particular, the Court referred to Article 
37 of the CRC, which contains an express provision against the 
death penalty for juveniles. The court noted the near unanimous 
ratification of the CRC as evidence of international condemnation 
of the practice. This nearly unanimous international consensus was 
cited prominently as a factor in the court's decision: 
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in 
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in 
the world that continues to give official sanction to the 
juvenile death penalty'l 5 . It is proper that we acknowledge 
the overwhelming weight of international opinion against 
the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the 
104 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of 
Liberty in the Americas, Principle XXII(3), OEA/Ser/L/V/ 1. 131 doc. 26 (March 
14, 2008). 
105Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
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understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance 
of young people may often be a factor in the crime. 
106 
Here, the same considerations are present. Article 37 has 
been interpreted by a competent treaty body, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, to preclude the use of solitary confinement but 
for "very exceptional cases." While Article 37 does not contain an 
express provision against the imposition of solitary confinement, 
this distinction is irrelevant. As discussed above, the reasoning in 
Roper focused on the existence of an international norm against the 
practice of the juvenile death penalty and the "overwhelming 
weight of international opinion." The lack of expressness of a 
particular treaty provision has no bearing on the weight or 
normative status of that provision. Hence, the international 
consensus against juvenile solitary confinement is not diminished 
because Article 37 lacks an express provision against it. 
The international consensus against juvenile solitary 
confinement is evident based on the near unanimous ratification of 
the CRC, the unequivocal positions of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child and the United Nations General assembly 
regarding the scope of the CRC, and the categorical prohibition 
against juvenile solitary confinement adopted by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. Such an international 
consensus strongly supports the finding that juvenile solitary 
confinement is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the recent decisions in Grahamand Roper have, to 
some extent, limited the ability of criminal justice system to 
impose adult sanctions on juvenile offenders, sensationalist media 
coverage of a limited number of exceptional cases has inflamed 
public opinion in favor of adult-like treatment of juveniles. 10 7 As 
106 Id. at 578. 
107 Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice,31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 
526 (2004). 
2011-2012 Solitary Confinement ofJuveniles 
long as public opinion favors punitive, adult-like treatment for 
juveniles, legislative remedies to the problem of placing juveniles 
in solitary confinement are unlikely. Judicial remedies are also 
unlikely given the broad discretion granted to state prison officials 
and general reluctance of judges to interfere with that discretion. 
The view of the Second Circuit Court Appeals in Sostre is 
indicative of this great degree of deference: "For a federal court... 
to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an 
inmate is a drastic interference with the state's free political and 
' administrative processes. 108 It seems that federal courts view the 
requirements of Federalism as more constitutionally significant 
than the plight of individual inmates in solitary confinement. 
Given the likely unwillingness of courts and legislatures to 
respond to the issue of solitary confinement of juveniles in adult 
facilities, advocacy and research efforts aimed at changing public 
opinion, and the opinion of corrections officials, remain the most viable 
alternatives. Such efforts proved to be effective in the case of J.S. 
Based on the advocacy efforts of a prisoners' rights 
organization, J.S.'s sentence of solitary confinement was 
ultimately reduced to approximately 8 months. Rather than 
attempting to file a lawsuit, which would have taken years to 
resolve and could have established unfavorable precedent on the 
issue of solitary confinement ofjuveniles, the organization in J.S.'s 
case opted for a strategy of advocating directly to corrections 
officials for a sentence reduction. After several administrative 
appeals outlining the harmful effects of solitary confinement on 
juveniles and sworn affidavits from medical experts substantiating 
these claims, prison officials eventually agreed to a reduced 
sentence of 8 months for J.S. J.S.'s exemplary behavior while in 
solitary confinement also played a significant role in the 
willingness of prison officials to reduce his sentence. 
Recently, J.S. was granted parole and will be released 
almost immediately after his sentence of solitary confinement 
expires. An inquiry by the Investigator General into the abuses 
committed against J.S. at the "Shock Incarceration" camp is 
'08 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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pending. The Investigator General is also inquiring into other 
suspected abuses there not involving J.S. Considering the pending 
investigation into widespread abuse at the "Shock Incarceration" 
camp, and the fact that J.S. was granted parole, it appears unlikely 
that he will face additional criminal charges for running away from 
the abusive conditions at the camp. Should he be charged, he may 
be able to raise a duress defense if the allegations of abuse and 
inability to obtain redress through the grievance system are 
substantiated by the Investigator General inquiry.'°9 
J.S.'s case is extraordinary, not only for the particular 
circumstances which led to his placement in solitary confinement, 
but also for the resilience and mental fortitude he demonstrated as 
a 16-year-old spending months in isolation. Thus far, he has not 
severely decompensated, mentally or physically, and has managed 
to remain in relatively good spirits without displaying any 
indications of "SHU Syndrome." 110 This is not the case for many 
individuals in solitary, who develop "SHU Syndrome" after only a 
few weeks or months in isolation. 
In sum, from a policy perspective, the solitary confinement 
of juveniles is counterproductive because it irreversibly damages 
normal development and may lead to future criminal behavior. From 
a constitutional perspective, the solitary confinement of juveniles 
seems to be teetering over the constitutional edge in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decisions in Graham and Roper. At least one 
federal district judge has recognized the reality that juveniles should 
be accorded different protections under the law than adults, 
particularly in the context of the criminal justice system: 
109 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1980). There, the Court 
stated that a prison escapee could obtain an defense of duress to prison escape if 
can demonstrate (1) a serious, imminent threat to his safety and (2) that escape 
was his only reasonable alternative given the imminence of the threat. Id. 
110 SHU Syndrome is characterized by the following: (1) hyperresponsitivity to 
external stimuli, (2) perceptual distortions, illusions, and hallucinations, (3) 
panic attacks, (4) difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory, (5) 
intrusive obsessional thoughts, (6) overt paranoia, and (7) problems with 
impulse control. See Grassian, supranote 19, at 335-36. 
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If a boy were confined indoors by his parents, given no 
education or exercise and allowed no visitors, and his 
medical needs were ignored, it is likely that the state would 
intervene and remove the child for his own protection. 
Certainly, then, the state . . . cannot treat the boy in the 
same manner and justify having deprived him of his liberty. 
Children are not chattels.II 
The real paradox is that solitary confinement, the harshest 
possible sanction in the prison context, is not reserved for the most 
culpable offenders. Many of the inmates in solitary confinement 
are simply mentally ill and unable to conform their behavior to 
prison regulations. 112 They may end up in solitary confinement for 
violations such as refusing a direct order, being out of place, or 
creating a disturbance. 113 If the trend of treating juveniles like 
adults in the criminal system continues, juveniles will continue to 
account for an increasingly greater proportion of the solitary 
confinement population because isolation is one of the few places 
where juveniles are safe in prison. Most problematic, however, is 
the fact that solitary confinement is often imposed on those who 
are least deserving of this most severe punishment, and most ill-
equipped to survive its dangers. As Dr. Stuart Grassian has written: 
It is a great irony that as one passes through the levels of 
incarceration - from the minimum to the moderate to the 
maximum security institutions, and then to the solitary 
confinement section of these institutions - one does not pass 
deeper and deeper into a subpopulation of the most ruthlessly 
Inmates of the Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (D. 
R.I. 1972) (citation omitted). 
112CORR. Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 3, at 22 ( "Research has demonstrated that 
mentally disordered inmates have greater difficulty conforming to strict 
correctional regimens than non-mentally ill inmates and are more likely to 
accumulate infractions and end up in disciplinary confinement"). 
113 According to the Correctional Association of New York, in 2003, 2 5 % of 
New York's disciplinary confinement population was sentenced for creating a 
disturbance or demonstration. Id. at 18. Only 10% were sentenced for assaults. 
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calculating criminals. Instead, ironically and tragically, one 
comes full circle back to those who are emotionally fragile 
and, often, severely mentally ill. The laws and practices that 
have established and perpetuated this tragedy deeply offend 
any sense of common human decency. 114 
114 Grassian, supra note 19, at 355. 
